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Attitudes toward presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American elections: 
Cognitive ability and support for Trump 
 
Abstract 
Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), we investigated the 
relationship between cognitive ability and attitudes toward and actual voting for presidential 
candidates in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. Presidential elections (i.e. Romney, Obama, Trump, 
and Clinton). Isolating this relationship from competing relationships, results showed that 
verbal ability was a significant negative predictor of support and voting for Trump (but not 
Romney), and a positive predictor of support and voting for Obama and Clinton. By 
comparing within and across the election years, our analyses revealed the nature of support 
for Trump, including that support for Trump was better predicted by lower verbal ability than 
education or income. In general, these results suggest that the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
had less to do with party affiliation, income or education, and more to do with basic cognitive 
ability.  
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Attitudes toward presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2016 American elections: 
Cognitive ability and support for Trump 
Defying almost all polls, pundits, and surprising even his own party, Donald Trump 
won the 2016 U.S. presidential election. One of the key questions following his victory was 
who voted for him? News outlets, expert commentators, and a wide range of researchers have 
subsequently tried to understand and characterize his voters. Two specific factors gained 
prominence: Income and education. For example, prior to the election, some media gave the 
impression that Trump supporters were largely blue-collar. While some have questioned the 
link between these factors and voting for Trump (Carnes & Lupu, 2016; Rothwell & Diego-
Rossell, 2016), little to no attention has been devoted to the role cognitive ability might have 
played in the 2016 election. Drawing on one of the most extensive and representative 
electoral U.S. samples (the American National Election Studies), the present study directly 
examined the relationship between cognitive ability and support for Trump.    
Investigating a possible connection between cognitive ability and political ideology is 
not novel. For example, indices of cognitive ability relate negatively (though often weakly) to 
social conservatism or right-wing authoritarian ideologies (e.g. Carl, 2014a; Choma, Hodson, 
Hoffarth, Charlesford, & Hafer, 2014; Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2001; Onreat et al., 
2015; Stankov, 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010). However, political ideology is complex and it is 
often necessary to divide the broader liberal-conservative continuum into at least two 
dimensions: social and economic/competitive (e.g. Choma, Ashton, & Hafer, 2010; Feldman 
& Johnston, 2014; Jost et al., 2003; for a summary, see Duckitt, 2001). The need for multiple 
dimensions might explain findings suggesting a negative relation between cognitive ability 
and support for income redistribution (Mollerstrom & Seim 2014) and a positive relation 
between cognitive ability and ‘thinking like an economist’ (i.e. rejecting anti-market, anti-
foreign, make-work, and pessimistic beliefs of the economy. See Caplan & Miller, 2010). 
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Furthermore, there is also some evidence for a U-shaped pattern, in which individuals lower 
or higher in cognitive ability (vs. those with moderate levels) are more politically liberal or 
left-leaning (Solon, 2014). Carl (2015b) also finds indications for a similar U-shaped pattern 
with respect to issues concerning economically or racially marginalized groups. However, 
based on his results and on a review of the literature he concludes that a positive relation 
between cognitive ability and support for socially liberal attitudes is the most consistent 
association between the two.  
Relying primarily on the WORDSUM measure of cognitive ability, some researchers 
also considered the relation between cognitive ability and party affiliation. Whereas some 
contend that cognitive ability is associated positively with support for Republicans (vs. 
Democrats; Carl, 2014b), others argue that there is no meaningful association between verbal 
ability and party affiliation (Ganzach, 2016). Other research suggests that the pattern of 
relationship between cognitive ability and party affiliation has changed over time, such that in 
younger generations there is a stronger impact of cognitive ability on Democratic affiliation 
(Ganzach, 2017; Meisenberg, 2015). The evidence concerning the relationship between 
cognitive ability and voting for Democrats versus Republicans, therefore, is mixed. Of 
particular importance, it is still unclear how cognitive ability relates to voting behavior in the 
2016 U.S. Presidential election. 
To complicate things even further, support for Trump may represent a unique 
phenomenon in American politics. Trump’s political ideology, for example, draws both from 
Republican and Democratic ideas; indeed, he garnered votes from supporters of both parties. 
That said, there are some investigations that provide initial indication that cognitive ability 
might have played a role in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Schram and Fording (2017) 
found that individuals who intended to vote for Trump scored lower on need for cognition, 
possessed less political knowledge, and thus were more likely to be swayed by non-factual 
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information (such as emotional appeals). Motta (2017) showed that anti-intellectualism 
sentiments and lower belief in experts (on matters such as climate change and nuclear power) 
related to greater support of Trump. Pennycook and Rand (2017) reported that greater 
analytical thinking related to lower belief in the accuracy of fake news (identified by 
snopes.com, an independent fact checker). Finally, Choma and Hanoch (2017) reported an 
association between right-wing ideological beliefs and favorabl attitudes of Trump.  
All of these studies focused on individual differences that may be associated with 
cognitive ability. However, only Choma and Hanoch’s (2017) data provide direct information 
about the relationships between cognitive ability and Trump support. However, they only 
found a significant relationship for affective evaluation of Trump, not for voting intentions. 
Furthermore, their results are open to alternative explanations since they relied on a non-
representative Mturk sample, did not clearly distinguish between the effects of cognitive 
ability and education, and did not adequately control for party affiliation and racial identity, 
which are crucial in accounting for the relationship between cognitive ability and support for 
presidential candidates (see Meisenberg, 2015 and Ganzach, 2016, respectively). 
To deal with these shortcomings we use data from the American National Election 
Studies (ANES), a large representative sample of American voters, to investigate directly the 
relation between cognitive ability and support for Trump. Furthermore, in our analyses, we 
give special attention to comparing the statistical effect of cognitive ability to the effects of 
income and education. Although both are indicators of socioeconomic status, education also 
strongly relates to cognitive ability (Deary, Strand, Smith & Fernandes, 2007); thus, by 
controlling for education we obtain a conservative estimate of the unique contribution of 
cognitive ability. Additionally, since a large part of the statistical effect of education on 
political preferences is shared with cognitive ability, whereas only a small part of the effect of 
income is shared with cognitive ability, a comparison between the effects of education and 
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income can shed light on the extent to which cognitive versus socioeconomic individual 
differences affect political preferences. This is particularly important given that 
socioeconomic differences were the most popular explanations for Trump’s success (e.g., 
Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Navarro, 2017). Finally, as cognitive ability may be associated with 
political orientation, or with support for conservative versus liberal parties (Kanazawa, 2010), 
it is important to separate support for Trump from support for the Republican Party in 
general. Therefore, in our analyses we (1) use party affiliation as a control in most of our 
models; and (2) compare support for the 2016 and 2012 Republican candidates.  
 
Method 
Data. 
 The data were taken from the 2012 and 2016 waves of the American National 
Election Studies (ANES; see, http://www.electionstudies.org/). The 2012 wave included 
5,914 participants, of which 2054 were interviewed face to face and 3860 answered an online 
survey. The 2016 wave included 4,271 participants, of which 1181 were interviewed face to 
face and 3090 answered an online survey. Both were random and representative samples of 
the American voters in the respective years. Interviews were conducted face-to-face (2054 
and 1081 for the 2012 and 2016 surveys, respectively) or through the internet (3,860 and 
3,090, respectively). In the present research, party affiliation, sex, age, race, income, and 
education were examined as control variables, and verbal ability was considered as the main 
predictor variable of attitudes toward Presidential candidates and voting behavior in the 2012 
and 2016 elections.   
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Measures. 
Cognitive ability. The 2012 and 2016 surveys included the WORDSUM test of 
verbal ability as a short measure of cognitive ability. WORDSUM originates from 
Thorndike’s (1942) early research on cognitive ability and cognitive ability testing and 
includes 10 multiple-choice questions, each asking respondents to identify the word or phrase 
in a set of 5 whose meaning was closest to a target word. For clarity of presentation, raw 
scores are converted to the commonly used IQ scale with a mean of 100 and standard 
deviation of 15. Due to the strong correlation between verbal ability and general cognitive 
ability, this measure is considered a good indicator of general cognitive ability (i.e., General 
Mental Ability. See Alwin, 1991; Miner, 1957; Zhu & Weiss, 2005)1. Wechsler (1958, p. 85) 
reports a correlation greater than .80 between overall WAIS score and the WAIS Vocabulary 
subtest. Miner (1961) concluded that the correlation between 20-word vocabulary tests and 
general cognitive ability was at least .75. WORDSUM had been used as a measure of 
cognitive ability in many GSS based studies (e.g., Hauser & Huang, 1997; Kanazawa, 2004), 
as well as research based on other large national databases (e.g., the American National 
Election Study; see Brandt, & Crawford, 2016; Carl, 2015a). Wechsler provides a well-
known explanation for the validity of tests such as the WORDSUM as measures of cognitive 
ability: "Contrary to lay opinion, the size of a man's vocabulary is not only an index of his 
schooling, but also an excellent measure of his general cognitive ability. Its excellence as a 
test of cognitive ability may stem from the fact that the number of words a man knows is at 
once a measure of his learning ability, his fund of verbal information and the general range of 
his ideas" (1958, p. 84). 
                                                          
1We note, however, that there are evidence suggesting that verbal ability is more strongly 
related to left-wing social attitudes than numerical ability (Onraet et. al., 2015).  
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Attitudes toward presidential candidates were measured by asking participants to 
rate their feelings toward the candidate (i.e. Romney, Obama, Trump, Clinton) on a 0-100 
scale (0 = unfavorable and cold, 100 = favorable and warm). 
 Party affiliations were measured were measured by asking participants to rate their 
feelings toward each of the two parties on a 0-100 scale (0 = unfavorable and cold, 100 = 
favorable and warm).  
Voting was measured by asking participants whether they voted for the Republican 
candidate (coded as 1) or the Democratic candidate (coded as 0). 
 Control variables were sex (1- female, 0 – male), race (black, Hispanic and white, 
the comparison group was other race), age (in years), education (years of education), and 
income (measured in increments of $5,000 up to an income of $80,000 and then in larger 
increments, resulting in a 28 point scale). 
 
Results  
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of the 2012 and 2016 
variables, respectively. The initial picture that emerges from this table is that the correlation 
between verbal ability and support for Trump was negative, r= -.080, but less negative than 
the correlation for Obama r= -.166. For Romney and Clinton these correlations were r=.075 
and r=-.027, respectively (p < .0001 for the first three. The last correlation was not 
significant). However, as Ganzach (2016) showed, relying on zero-order relationships in 
assessing the relationships between cognitive ability and political attitudes can be rather 
misleading. For example, he showed that race can make a difference because black 
Americans, who tend to score lower on cognitive tests than white Americans, mostly vote 
Democrat, yet white Americans with the very highest scores also tend to vote Democrat (see 
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also the discussion in Solon 2014, and Carl, 2015b). Education and income, too, can make a 
difference, the reason being that part of the effect of cognitive ability on right-wing economic 
preferences is mediated by perceived self-interest on the part of people with higher cognitive 
ability, who generally have better education and higher incomes. Indeed, the analyses below 
show that the relationships between verbal ability and support for the 2012 and 2016 
presidential candidates change dramatically when appropriate controls are exerted2. 
 
Preliminary analyses 
We first offer a simplified presentation of our main results by comparing a basic 
regression model of attitudes toward the Republican candidate in the 2012 and 2016 
elections. The results of this model are presented in Table 2. Verbal ability was associated 
negatively with support for the Republican candidate in both elections. However, its 
association with support for Trump was stronger than its association with support for 
Romney (the standardized coefficient of verbal ability was about twice as large in predicting 
attitude toward Trump than in predicting attitude toward Romney,  -.161 vs. -.083). Thus, 
verbal ability appears to be an important predictor of support for Trump. Note, however, that, 
as shown below, the negative association between verbal ability and support for Romney is 
largely due to the negative association between verbal ability and support for the Republican 
Party: When party affiliation is controlled, the negative association between verbal ability 
and support for Romney, but not for Trump, disappears (see Table 3 below).  
                                                          
2Since the political attitude measures we rely on in the current study are primarily oriented 
toward specific elections, there are no previous reports about their relationships with verbal 
ability. However, the ANES includes more general measures of political attitudes, measures 
that were also collected in other surveys, allowing us to compare the relationships between 
verbal ability and political attitudes in the ANEs to such relationships in other databases. In 
Appendix S1 of the supplementary material we describe two such comparisons. 
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There are some other results of interest in this table. Income was not associated with 
support for Trump, but it was associated positively with support for Romney (-.003 vs. 
+.081). Education was associated negatively with support for Trump, but not for Romney  
(-.114 vs. +.014). These results show that the effect of education, which involves both 
cognitive and socioeconomic factors, should be separated from the effect of income, which, 
ceteris paribus, involves primarily socioeconomic factors. Whereas in the 2012 election, 
income was a significant predictor of support for the Republican candidate and education was 
a non-significant predictor, in the 2016 election, income was non-significant and education 
was significant, negatively associated with support for the Republican candidate.  
One problem with the models in Table 2 is that they do not isolate attitude toward the 
presidential candidate from attitude toward the party. Although the causal relationship 
between the two is not clear, a more conservative approach to examine attitudes toward 
presidential candidates is to control for attitudes toward the party. Thus, in the rest of the 
paper we control for party affiliation in all our models. 
Table 3 presents the results of regression models of attitudes toward each of the four 
presidential candidates controlling for party affiliation. For Trump, there was a negative 
association between verbal ability and attitude. For the other three candidates, the association 
with verbal ability was either positive (for Obama and Clinton) or negligible (for Romney). 
The difference between the association of education and attitudes toward the candidates was 
also striking in that education was negatively associated with attitude toward Trump, but 
positively associated with attitudes toward the other three candidates. These differences are 
consistent with a general dislike of the more intellectual to the candidacy of Trump. The 
association between income and attitude toward Trump was non-significant. This finding 
suggests that it is not the relationship between education and socioeconomic status that 
underlies the negative effect of education, but the discomfort of the more intellectual to the 
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candidacy of Trump. Income was also not a significant predictor of attitudes toward Obama 
or Romney; but was significantly related to attitude toward Clinton. Party affiliation was 
positively associated with favorable attitude toward each of the candidates. However, this 
association was notably weaker for Trump than for the other three candidates.3,4 
We turn now to analyses that focus on differences in the relationship between verbal 
ability and attitudes toward the four candidates, as well as differences in the relationships of 
education and income (effects of other demographic variables are discussed in footnotes). We 
conduct these tests utilizing the combined 2012 and 2016 data in two separate analyses. In the 
first, we compare attitudes for the same party candidates in different elections. In the second, 
we compare attitudes of candidates of rival parties in the same election (competing 
candidates). 
 
Comparison between same party candidates 
In this analysis, we estimated two models, one for the two Democratic candidates and 
one for the two Republican candidates. These models analyzed simultaneously the data of 
same party candidates from both elections. They included a main effect election dummy 
                                                          
3Note that the R2 of the Trump model (.486) is considerably lower than the R2 of the models 
of the other candidates (.686, .672 and .636 for Obama, Clinton and Romney, respectively). 
This is primarily due to party affiliation having a much weaker effect on support for Trump 
than on support for the other three candidates (βs of .610, .768, 771 and .762, respectively). 
Other effects of interest are: Being older significantly predicted favorable attitude toward 
Clinton, Romney, or Trump, whereas being younger significantly predicted favorable attitude 
toward Obama. Sex was only a significant predictor for the Republican candidates with men 
holding more positive attitudes of Romney or Trump than women. Black Americans held 
more positive attitudes toward Clinton or Obama, and less favorable attitudes of Trump. 
White Americans held less favorable attitudes toward the Democratic candidates and more 
favorable attitudes of Trump. Hispanic Americans held more favorable attitudes of Clinton, 
but less favorable attitudes of Trump. Racial identity was not a significant predictor of 
attitude toward Romney. 
4To examine the sensitivity of the results to the type of survey (face to face vs. on line  
interview) we estimated the models of Table 3 only for the face to face samples. The pattern 
of the results of these analyses (see Appendix S2 in the supplementary material) was similar 
to the patterns of the results of the entire samples.  
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variable (0 for the 2012 election and 1 for the 2016 election), the independent variables of our 
basic model and, in addition, the interactions of these variables with the election dummy. 
These interactions test the hypotheses that the effects of our independent variables were 
different in the two elections. The results of these models are reported in Table 4.  
The results reveal significant verbal ability X election and education X election 
interactions (ΔR2 of 0.95% and 1.8%, respectively) in the Republican candidates’ model, 
which represent non-trivial interaction effect sizes (see Aguinis, Beaty, Boik & Pierce, 2005, 
for a discussion of interaction's effect size). These interactions are associated with the clear 
negative relationships of verbal ability and education with attitude toward Trump and the 
weak, non-significant relationships of verbal ability and education with attitude toward 
Romney, when controlling for party affiliation (see Table 3 and Figure 1). These significant 
interactions in the Republican candidates' model stand in contrast to the non-significant 
interactions in the Democratic candidates' model, suggesting that verbal ability and education 
had very similar associations with attitudes toward the 2012 and 2016 Democratic candidates.  
The income X election interaction in the Republican candidates' model was also 
significant. It was associated with income having a positive relationship with attitude toward 
Romney and a non-significant relationship with attitude toward Trump. However, this 
interaction was considerably weaker (ΔR2=0.35%) than the verbal ability X election and 
education X election interactions. Thus, the current data suggest that support for Trump is 
better explained by the intellectual orientation of his supporters than by their income. (The 
income X election interaction in the Democratic candidates’ model was also significant, but 
in the opposite direction. This is consistent with high-income voters moving their support 
between the 2012 and 2016 elections from the Republican to the Democratic candidate.)  
Finally, the party affiliation X election interaction was significant in the Republican 
candidates' model. Affiliation was more strongly associated with attitude toward Romney 
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than attitude toward Trump. We view this in terms of a more important role of ideology in 
support for Trump than for Romney. Note that our data also revealed some tendency for a 
stronger association between affiliation and attitude toward Obama than toward Clinton (the 
affiliation X election interaction was marginally significant in the Democratic candidates’ 
model), suggesting that the 2016 election was less ideological than the 2012 election. 
 
Comparison between competing candidates  
Next, we compare the relationships between our predictors and attitudes toward 
candidates of rival parties in the same election. As the candidates competed against each 
other, the appropriate dependent variable is the difference in attitudes between the two 
candidates, which we label Competing Candidates Attitude Difference, or CCAD. This 
variable was created by subtracting the attitude toward the Democratic candidate from the 
attitude toward the Republican candidate5. In addition, as differences in attitudes are likely to 
map onto behavior, we use actual voting as a behavioral indicator for the difference in 
attitudes between the competing candidates.  
Table 5 presents models in which CCAD and voting (coded as 1 for voting for the 
Republican candidate and 0 for the Democratic candidate) are regressed on our predictor 
variables as well as the gap between the attitudes toward the two parties6. It is clear from the 
                                                          
5Another approach to examine differences in attitudes between competing candidates, an 
approach similar to the approach we took in analyzing the difference in attitudes between 
same party candidates, is to examine the interactions between our independent variables and a 
party dummy, where attitudes toward the two candidates is a within subject variable. We 
prefer the approach described in the text because (1) it directly incorporates the fact that the 
two candidates compete against each other and (2) it is the attitudinal counterpart of our 
second behavioral, voting, dependent variable. 
6 We used OLS (linear probability model) rather than logistic regression for modeling voting. 
One reason was ease of interpretation. Another was that our modeling of voting involved also 
interaction effects, whose estimates are known to be biased in logistic models (Hellevik, 
2007). However, when the dependent variable is approximately evenly distributed around 
50%, linear probability models are very similar to logistic models. Indeed, as can be seen 
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regressions that whereas both verbal ability and education were associated negatively with 
support for the Republican versus the Democratic candidate in 2016, they did not 
significantly predict support for one candidate over the other in the 2012 election. This 
pattern emerged for both CCAD and voting. Income, on the other hand, was significantly 
associated with support for the Republican over the Democratic candidate in the 2012 
election, but was not significantly associated with support for this candidate in the 2016 
election. Thus, verbal ability had a significant statistical effect in the 2016 election, but not in 
the 2012 election, while income had a significant effect in the 2012 election, but not in the 
2016 election. The effects of education in the two elections were similar to the effects of 
verbal ability, suggesting that in our models, education is more of an indicator of cognitive 
functioning than socioeconomic status.  
These different patterns of the effects of verbal ability, education and income on 
attitudes toward competing candidates is tested in a model that analyses simultaneously the 
CCAD or voting from both elections. This model adds the interactions between all of our 
predictors and an election dummy to the main effects7. Table 6 presents the results of this 
interaction model, and Figure 2 depicts the election X verbal ability interaction by plotting 
the predicted probability of voting for the Republican candidate for low and high verbal 
ability voters (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively)8.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from Appendix S3 in the supplementary material, when modeling our data using logistic 
models we obtained very similar results. 
7The results also revealed additional significant interactions associated with Hispanic, Blacks, 
female and younger people having a less favorable attitude toward the Republican vs. the 
Democratic candidate in the 2016 than in the 2012 election. Party affiliation was also more 
important in the 2012 than the 2016 voting.  
8Note that the voting results reflect a bias in reporting toward younger, minority and female 
voters (McDonald, 2007). This, however, should not affect the comparison between the 2012 
and 2016 elections. 
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Discussion 
Electing the U.S. president is one of the most important democratic rights people 
have, with important implications for American citizens and people around the world. Thus, 
understanding voting behavior in the US has been of key interest to researchers from many 
fields. Trump’s election in 2016 has proven to be a unique phenomenon, in more than one 
way. Although in analyzing the results of this election, some role was given to individual 
differences such as right-wing, authoritarian, and populist ideologies (Choma & Hanoch, 
2017; MacWilliams, 2016; Rahn & Oliver, 2016; for a discussion see Pettigrew, 2017), the 
focus on socioeconomic factors has been the main perspective by which these results were 
understood. We believe that the present work suggests that cognitive ability may be a most 
basic explanatory variable underlying the apparent effects of socioeconomic variables on 
support for Trump. It is an important explanatory variable since both left-wing social 
attitudes (e.g., pro-abortion, pro-immigration, anti-racist) and right-wing economic attitudes 
(e.g., pro-free trade, opposition to price controls, opposition to redistribution), which are 
positively associated with cognitive ability (Caplan & Miller, 2010; Carl, 2015a; Mollerstrom 
& Seim, 2014; Solon, 2014) stand in sharp contrast to Trump's platform. 
The present research illustrates the complex relationships between cognitive ability 
and other key explanatory variables in predicting political preference (see Meisenberg, 2015 
and Ganzach, 2016). In our data, basic correlations showed that verbal ability related 
negatively to support for Trump and for Obama (and more so for Obama), positively to 
support for Romney, and non-significantly with support for Clinton. However, these 
relationships are potentially misleading, because they do not account for the role of 
socioeconomic and demographic variables (Ganzach, 2016), as well as the role of party 
affiliation. When these variables are controlled for, the effect of verbal ability on support for 
Trump becomes even more negative, but the effect on support for Obama becomes clearly 
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positive. Similarly, when the appropriate statistical controls are exerted, the effect of verbal 
ability on support for Romney becomes non-significant whereas the effect on support for 
Clinton becomes positive. 
The different pattern of relations for Romney versus Trump illustrates the importance 
of distinguishing between Trump support and Republican Party support. Specifically, verbal 
ability was not a significant predictor of support for Romney, but it was for Trump. 
Education was also a positive predictor of support for Romney (and Obama and Clinton), but 
a negative predictor of Trump support. Further, whereas higher income predicted Romney 
support, income did not predict support for Trump. Thus, qualifying previous positions (e.g. 
Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Nararro, 2017), our analyses indicate that support for Trump was 
less about socioeconomic standing and more about intellect, i.e. about cognitive ability and 
education. Another key difference was the relatively stronger predictive role of party 
affiliation for Romney than Trump. Indeed, party affiliation was of comparable strength for 
Obama, Clinton, and Romney, but notably weaker for Trump. This effect also explains the 
greater variance accounted for in the models for Obama, Clinton, and Romney compared to 
Trump. These findings highlight the (lower) importance of ideology in support for Trump.  
 A number of caveats should be acknowledged in interpreting the present results. First, 
these data are correlational and therefore no causation can be inferred. Second, verbal ability 
was assessed in the present study. While the WORDSUM is a widely used index of verbal 
ability, it is not the most reliable measure of cognitive ability (Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994), 
and it may be affected by education more than other measures. Incorporating several indices 
of cognitive ability and considering their relation to candidate support would be fruitful for 
understanding the possible connections between cognitive ability and presidential candidate 
support. This would also help to appreciate the potential different roles that crystallized 
versus fluid cognitive ability might play in predicting political variables.  
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Conclusions 
The present analyses reveal that intellectual factors played an important role in the 
2016 election. In particular, these analyses suggest that cognitive ability and education played 
a more important role in the 2016 than 2012 election. In contrast, income played a more 
important role in the 2012 election. Further, party affiliation was less important in the 2016 
than in the 2012 election, an effect which is also consistent with a weaker role of intellectual 
factors in the 2016 election. In general, the findings  suggest that intellectual factors may play 
a crucial role in political preferences, sometimes even a more important role than 
socioeconomic factors. 
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Figure 1: The difference in the effect of verbal ability on support for Trump and 
Romney for lower verbal ability (1 standard deviation below the mean) and higher 
verbal ability (1 standard deviation above the mean). 
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Figure 2: The predicted probability of voting for the Republican candidate for low and 
high verbal ability voters (one standard deviation below and above the mean, 
respectively) 
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Table 1: descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for 2012 (below diagonal) and 2016 (above diagonal) 
 Mean 
2012 
STD 
2012 
Mean 
2016 
STD 
2016 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Att. Democratic candidate 54.92 29.23 48.18 30.05 1.000 -0.664 0.809 -0.499 -0.010 0.109 0.294 -0.305 0.148 -0.061 0.035 -0.027 
2. Att. toward Republican candidate 42.04 27.82 43.51 27.33 -0.682 1.000 -0.609 0.658 0.125 -0.103 -0.218 0.256 -0.131 -0.007 -0.117 -0.080 
3. Att. Democratic party 58.36 34.49 42.15 34.23 0.814 -0.578 1.000 -0.453 -0.057 0.112 0.276 -0.285 0.131 -0.106 -0.011 -0.075 
4. Att. Republican party 44.48 30.66 36.95 34.91 -0.595 0.777 -0.520 1.000 0.070 -0.027 -0.190 0.169 -0.056 -0.011 -0.101 -0.106 
5. Age 50.62 16.85 49.58 17.58 -0.103 0.147 -0.069 0.079 1.000 0.005 -0.064 0.155 -0.132 0.021 0.005 0.160 
6. Sex 1.52 0.50 1.53 0.50 0.087 -0.064 0.117 -0.022 -0.007 1.000 0.043 -0.005 -0.027 -0.127 -0.007 -0.016 
7. Black 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.411 -0.262 0.382 -0.267 -0.054 0.049 1.000 -0.503 -0.110 -0.180 -0.087 -0.190 
8. White 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45 -0.409 0.267 -0.390 0.232 0.184 -0.029 -0.552 1.000 -0.539 0.173 0.137 0.233 
9. Hispanic 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.118 -0.066 0.135 -0.019 -0.152 -0.004 -0.207 -0.548 1.000 -0.087 -0.159 -0.139 
10. Income 13.64 8.16 15.39 8.08 -0.144 0.132 -0.165 0.068 0.059 -0.098 -0.166 0.223 -0.117 1.000 0.403 0.317 
11. Education 10.63 2.47 11.17 2.32 -0.068 0.061 -0.124 -0.007 -0.013 -0.053 -0.084 0.185 -0.167 0.406 1.000 0.374 
12. Verbal ability 0.67 0.24 0.68 0.26 -0.166 0.075 -0.209 0.003 0.195 -0.034 -0.273 0.334 -0.144 0.348 0.413 1.000 
Note: For 2012 n varies between 5394 and 5914 depending on missing values. For 2016 n varies between 4069 and 4227. 
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Table 2: Main effect models of attitudes toward republican candidates (no control for party 
affiliation) 
 
 Romney Trump 
 b stderr β b stderr β 
Intercept 35.37*** 3.12 0.000 67.64*** 3.82 0.000 
Age 0.230*** 0.025 0.124 0.218*** 0.030 0.109 
Sex -2.52* 0.80 -0.041 -6.80*** 1.03 -0.098 
Black -15.50*** 1.97 -0.186 -23.72*** 2.49 -0.200 
White 8.85*** 1.77 0.140 9.98*** 1.91 0.129 
Hispanic -0.476 1.967 -0.006 -12.92*** 2.43 -0.113 
Income  0.306*** 0.056 0.081 0.013 0.073 0.003 
Education  0.181 0.191 0.014 -1.71*** 0.257 -0.114 
Verbal ability -10.87*** 2.03 -0.083 -22.92*** 2.39 -0.161 
n 5232 3929 
R2 .112 .144 
 
Note: *** - p<.0001, ** - p<.001, * - p<.01, ǂ - p<.05 
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Table 3: Main effect models of attitudes toward presidential candidates (controlling for party 
affiliation) 
 Democratic candidates Republican candidates 
 Obama Clinton Romney Trump 
 b stderr β b stderr β b stderr β b stderr β 
Intercept 5.48 2.15 0.000 -17.62 2.37 0.000 -3.74 2.05 0.000 19.80 3.13 0.000 
Party affiliation 0.91*** 0.01 0.768 0.88*** 0.01 0.771 0.84*** 0.01 0.762 0.78*** 0.02 0.610 
Age -0.07*** 0.02 -0.035 0.09*** 0.02 0.045 0.13*** 0.02 0.071 0.14*** 0.02 0.070 
Sex -0.66 0.54 -0.010 1.49 0.64 0.022 -1.98*** 0.52 -0.032 -6.29*** 0.81 -0.091 
Black 8.19*** 1.34 0.088 10.21*** 1.55 0.088 -1.97 1.28 -0.024 -10.06*** 1.96 -0.085 
White -4.80*** 1.19 -0.068 -3.31* 1.18 -0.043 2.38 1.14 0.038 6.32*** 1.50 0.081 
Hispanic -0.26 1.31 -0.003 5.59** 1.50 0.050 -0.68 1.26 -0.008 -8.42*** 1.91 -0.073 
Income  -0.07 0.04 -0.016 0.07 0.04 0.017 0.16*** 0.04 0.043 -0.01 0.06 -0.003 
Education  0.52*** 0.13 0.037 0.59*** 0.16 0.040 0.47*** 0.12 0.037 -0.92*** 0.20 -0.061 
Verbal ability 6.28*** 1.35 0.043 5.85*** 1.47 0.042 1.38 1.31 0.011 -8.73*** 1.90 -0.061 
n 5225 3887 5210 3868 
R2 .686 .672 .636 .486 
 
*** - p<.0001, ** - p<.001, * - p<.01, ǂ - p<.05
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Table 4: Interaction models of differences in attitudes toward same party candidates 
 Democratic candidates  Republican candidates 
 b stderr  b Stderr 
Intercept 5.476 2.162  -3.739 2.381 
Election  -23.09 3.196  23.54 3.602 
Party affiliation 0.911 0.010  0.844 0.011 
Age -0.072 0.017  0.132 0.019 
Sex -0.656 0.546  -1.980 0.601 
Black 8.191 1.350  -1.965 1.482 
White -4.803 1.193  2.377 1.323 
Hispanic -0.258 1.321  -0.676 1.461 
Income  -0.068 0.038  0.161 0.042 
Education  0.522 0.128  0.470 0.143 
Verbal ability 6.277 1.363  1.385 1.521 
Affiliation x Election -0.032ǂ 0.015  -0.067*** 0.017 
Age x Election 0.160*** 0.025  0.007 0.028 
Sex x Election 2.149* 0.834  -4.307*** 0.919 
Black x Election 2.012 2.043  -8.095** 2.251 
White x Election 1.489 1.670  3.938** 1.851 
Hispanic x Election 5.851* 1.989  -7.744** 2.204 
Income x Election 0.142* 0.058  -0.175* 0.064 
Education x Election  0.071 0.202  -1.393*** 0.225 
Verbal ability x Election -0.424 1.992  -10.119*** 2.237 
n 9113  9079 
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R2 .695  .569 
Note: Each model analyzes simultaneously the data of same party candidates from both elections. Election was coded as 0 for 
the 2012 election and 1 for the 2016 election. *** - p<.0001, ** - p<.001,     * - p<.01, ǂ - p<.05 
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Table 5: Differences between competing candidates 
 
 CCAD  Voting  
 2012 2016  2012  2016  
b stderr β b stderr β  b stderr β b stderr β 
Intercept -11.26 3.13 0.000 27.67 4.08 0.000  0.423*** 0.039 0.000 0.650*** 0.048 0.000 
Attitude gap 1.01*** 0.01 0.839 1.02*** 0.01 0.789  0.007*** 0.000 0.748 0.007*** 0.000 0.757 
Age 0.18*** 0.03 0.051 0.02 0.03 0.005  0.001* 0.000 0.027 0.001** 0.000 0.046 
Sex -0.71 0.81 -0.006 -6.65*** 1.10 -0.053  0.016 0.010 0.016 -0.021 0.012 -0.022 
Black -4.88ǂ 2.01 -0.030 -13.12*** 2.70 -0.061  -0.052ǂ 0.025 -0.041 -0.097* 0.031 -0.058 
White 5.23* 1.78 0.042 7.30** 2.05 0.052  0.066* 0.022 0.065 0.064* 0.025 0.055 
Hispanic 0.50 1.97 0.003 -11.61*** 2.61 -0.056  -0.042 0.025 -0.030 -0.057 0.032 -0.031 
Income  0.18* 0.06 0.024 -0.13 0.08 -0.016  0.002* 0.001 0.034 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 
Education  -0.03 0.19 -0.001 -1.18*** 0.27 -0.043  -0.004 0.002 -0.019 -0.009* 0.003 -0.042 
Verbal  
ability 
-3.12 2.04 -0.012 -9.61** 2.58 -0.037  -0.004 0.025 -0.002 -0.127*** 0.029 -0.059 
n 5208 3845  3783  2402  
R2  .767 .710  .645  .663  
 
Note: CCAD (Competing Candidates Attitude Difference) is the difference in attitudes between the two candidates in the same 
election (thus a positive value of CCAD indicates being more favourable toward the Republican candidate). Voting was coded 
as 1 [0] if the participant voted for the Republican [Democratic] candidate. Attitude gap is the difference between attitude toward 
the Republican and Democratic party, positive values indicate more support for the Republican party. *** - p<.0001, ** - p<.001, 
* - p<.01, ǂ - p<.05 
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Table 6: Differences between competing candidates – interactions with election 
 CCAD  Voting 
 b Stderr  b stderr 
Intercept -11.62 4.00  0.423 0.039 
Election  40.73 6.35  0.227 0.062 
Attitude gap 1.04 0.01  0.007 0.000 
Age 0.17 0.03  0.001 0.000 
Sex 0.60 0.98  0.016 0.010 
Black -3.37 2.52  -0.052 0.025 
White 7.09 2.27  0.066 0.022 
Hispanic 0.39 2.53  -0.042 0.025 
Income  0.10 0.07  0.002 0.001 
Education  0.00 0.24  -0.004 0.002 
Verbal ability -4.71 2.54  -0.004 0.025 
Party-affilation. X Election 0.03ǂ 0.02  0.000 0.000 
Age x Election -0.10ǂ 0.05  0.001 0.000 
Sex x Election -5.66** 1.58  -0.038ǂ 0.015 
Black x Election -9.23ǂ 4.06  -0.045 0.040 
White x Election -2.46 3.41  -0.002 0.033 
Hispanic x Election -10.97* 4.13  -0.015 0.040 
Income x Election -0.21** 0.11  -0.003ǂ 0.001 
Education x Election  -1.35 0.39  -0.005 0.004 
Verbal ability x Election -8.43ǂ 3.95  -0.123* 0.038 
n 9053  6185 
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R2  .742  .653 
 
Note: CCAD (Competing Candidates Attitude Difference) is the difference in attitudes between the two candidates in the same 
election (thus a positive value of CCAD indicates being more favourable toward the Republican candidate). Voting was coded 
as 1 [0] if the participant voted for the Republican [Democratic] candidate. Election was coded as 0 for the 2012 election and 1 
for the 2016 election. Attitude gap is the difference between attitude toward the Republican and Democratic party, positive 
values indicate more support for the Republican party. *** - p<.0001, ** - p<.001, * - p<.01, ǂ - p<.05 
